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COMMENTS
DISPOSITION OF MOOT CASES BY THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The usual manner in which the United States Supreme Court disposes of
cases moot upon appeal has been succinctly stated:
When it is shown that a case brought from a lower federal court has become moot,
the Supreme Court, under the present practice, usually reverses or vacates the judg-
ment or decree and remands with directions to dismiss the bill, complaint or petition.
... If the proceeding is one to review the decision of a state court, and the cause is
shown to have become moot since the entry of the judgment or decree of the highest
state court and pending decision by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court remands
the cause to the state court in order that that court may take such further proceedings
as may be deemed appropriate.1
The Supreme Court's practice of eliminating all lower proceedings in federal
moot cases may surprise the average lawyer.2 Reversal or vacation has even
'Robertson & Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States § 273
(Wolfson and Kurland's ed., 1951).
The boundaries of mootness are not clearly defined. A generally quoted judicial definition
of a moot case is: "[A] moot case is one which seeks to get a judgment on a pretended con-
troversy, when in reality there is none, or a decision in advance about a right before it has
been actually asserted and contested, or a judgment upon some matter which, when ren-
dered, for any reason, cannot have any practical effect upon a then existing controversy."
Ex parte Steele, 162 Fed. 694, 701 (N.D. Ala., 1908).
Abatement is distinguished from mootness by the fact that in abatement the suit termi-
nates solely because of want of proper parties capable of proceeding therein. Consult
Bouvier, Law Dictionary 6. Cases dismissed as abated, though closely related to moot ap-
peals in the end result, are not included in this note. Consult Richardson v. McChesney,
218 U.S. 487, 492-3 (1910), illustrating the similarity of the doctrines.
The question of what constitutes a moot case is not within the scope of this comment.
Every case which the Supreme Court has held to be moot (together with the lower decisions
when reported) has been read and indication will be made as to why each case was declared
to be moot (cases cited notes 8-17 infra). For an excellent discussion of federal mootness
doctrines and cases consult Diamond, Federal jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 125 (1946). Other discussions may be found in: Robertson & Kirkham, Juris-
diction of the Supreme Court of the United States, c. 36 (Wolfson and Kurland's ed.,
1951); Cases Moot Upon Appeal: A Limit on the judicial Power, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
772 (1955); Administrative Law: Questions "Moot" on Appeal, 22 Ind. L. J. 235 (1947);
"Moot" Administrative Orders, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 628 (1940).
'See Table 1. Illinois in contrast to the Supreme Court has retained the practice of
dismissing moot appeals. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.
2d 769 (1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 63 N.E.
2d 858 (1945) ; First National Bank of Jonesboro v. Road Dist. No. 8, 389 Ill. 156, 58 N.E.
2d 884 (1945); People ex rel. Cassidy v. Fisher, 372 Ill. 146, 22 N.E. 2d 937 (1939). Only
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been stated by the Supreme Court to be the "duty" of the circuit court of
appeals.3 (The Court did not say whether this "duty" to vacate applied to
every moot appeal or only those where the appellant requested vacation.) 4
Frequently overlooked is the fact that for much the greater part of its history
the Supreme Court's customary procedure was to dismiss in moot cases appeals
from both the federal and the state courts.
A decree in a case moot on appeal by definition cannot directly effect any
change in the legal rights of the parties to the action. The main interest, there-
fore, in the disposition of moot appeals arises from a consideration of the
effects the original adversary decree may have upon the same parties in
future actions, and what weight ought to be accorded the adversary decree in
litigation involving other parties. The first problem concerns res judicata, and
the second, stare decisis. The manner of disposition is primarily important,
since only if the moot appeal is dismissed is there an existing lower judgment
from which res judicata effects could flow. Stare decisis would theoretically
operate independently of the manner of disposition chosen, but the Supreme
Court possibly could show displeasure with the lower decree by reversing or
vacating it.
This comment first undertakes to demonstrate the change in the general
manner of disposition and to determine to what extent the changes have been
conscious and motivated by considerations of justice or reason. All cases held
by the Supreme Court to be moot, either at their inception or on appeal, have
been investigated and classified.5 The res judicata and stare decisis effects of
judgments moot on appeal will then be examined.
where good cause can be shown will an Illinois appellate court reverse or vacate a judgment
which has become moot on appeal. E.g., People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E. 2d 736
(1949). Redlich had been ordered by the court to submit to a psychiatric examination to
determine whether or not he should be prosecuted as a normal person. Redlich refused to
submit, and was sentenced for contempt. The appeal was from this contempt sentence.
Before the Illinois Supreme Court heard the appeal, Redlich was prosecuted under his origi-
nal indictment and convicted, thus mooting the contempt appeal. Since Redlich would re-
main in prison indefinitely under the contempt sentence otherwise, the court reversed that
sentence.
'See Duke Power Company v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S. 259, 267 (1936). Cited
with approval in United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950). The Su-
preme Court has never said that such a "duty" applies to itself. Consult note 18 infra.
'See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950). Consult note
38 infra.
'There has been some discussion as to whether the Supreme Court in speaking of the
lack of the "case" or "controversy" element in a moot case is referring to the common law
requirement for a justiciable controversy or to the Article I jurisdictional requirement
of the federal Constitution. It is generally agreed that this lack is a self-imposed common
law judicial limitation on jurisdiction based upon convenience and necessity. Consult
Robertson & Kirkham, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States § 270
(Wolfson and Kurland's ed., 1951); "Moot" Administrative Orders, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 628,
629 (1940). Therefore the many cases which show a failure to comply with the Article
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The Supreme Court at some time-undeterminable precisely-after the
turn of the present century changed the general manner of disposition of moot
appeals from federal and state decisions from dismissal of the appeal to a
disposition which eliminated the entire proceeding. Because the Court assumed
in Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. Compania General de Tabacos,6
in 1919, that the "proper course... as is shown by many precedents, [was]
to reverse the judgment and remand the cause with a direction that it be dis-
missed without costs to either party," 7 the year 1919 and the Compania Gen-
eral case will arbitrarily be taken as the dividing line. This is the first decision
in which the Supreme Court assumes that the disposition is established. Table
1 shows the change in the manner of disposition used in terms of pre-1919
and post-1919.
TABLE 1
Pre-1919 Post-1919
Cases from the federal system:
Judgment reversed or vacated and cause
remanded with directions to dismiss
the complaint .................... 98 370
Appeal dismissed ................... 23" 6"
Erratic disposition .................. 2' 31
Cases from the state courts:
Judgment reversed or vacated and cause
remanded for appropriate proceedings li 6"
Appeal dismissed ................... 11" 21
III requirement of "case" and "controversy" and which do not concern common law moot-
ness are not included within this note as they sometimes are in discussions of cases moot
on appeal. Consult Cases Moot On Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 772, 776 (1955), discussing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
a 249 U.S. 425 (1919) (Amendment abrogated the provision in Philippine act which
court below held to be undue delegation of legislative power).
7 Ibid., at 426-27.
' judgment below reversed (or vacated) and remanded with instructions to dismiss or
take appropriate action: Berry v. Davis, 242 U.S. 468 (1917) (injunction granted below on
basis of statute which had since been amended to exclude plaintiff); United States v.
American-Asiatic S.S. Co., 242 U.S. 537 (1917) (alleged anti-trust activity terminated by
war) ; United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Action Gesellschaft, 239 U.S.
466 (1916) (alleged antitrust activity terminated by war); Metzger Motor Car Co. v.
Parrott, 233 U.S. 36 (1914) (statutory cause of action abolished pending appellate deci-
sion) ; New Orleans Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 161 U.S. 101 (1896) (disputed statute had
been repealed); South Spring Gold Co. v. Amador Gold Co., 145 U.S. 300 (1892) (reversed
and remanded for further proceedings. A third party had purchased control of both ad-
versaries); Meyer v. Pritchard, 131 U.S. ccix Appx. (1877) (the disputed patent was sur-
rendered pending appeal); Gardner v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 131 U.S. ciii Appx.
(1873) (suit discovered to be collusive, Supreme Court vacated its previous judgment) ;
Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. (U.S.) 250 (1850) ("Writ of error dismissed and cause remanded
to be dealt with according to instructions.") (collusive suit discovered).
19ss]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
'Judgment below reversed (or vacated) and remanded with instructions to dismiss or
take appropriate action: Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 610 (1954) (relief requested had since
been granted); Gray v. U. of Tennessee, 342 U.S. 517 (1952) relief requested had since
been granted); SEC v. Harrison, 340 U.S. 908 (1951) (cause of mootness unreported);
Howard v. United States, 340 U.S. 898 (1950) (acquiescence of one party) ; SEC v. Phila-
delphia Co., 337 U.S. 901 (1949) (settlement); Hodge v. Tulsa County Election Board,
335 U.S. 889 (1948) (cause of mootness not reported; probably passage of time made relief
requested ineffectual); SEC v. Engineers Public Service Co., 332 U.S. 788 (1947) (settle-
ment) ; Farmers Grain Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 332 U.S.
748 (1947) (settlement); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United States, 326 U.S. 690 (1945)
(cause of mootness unreported); SEC v. Long Island Lighting Co., 325 U.S. 833 (1945)
(premature controversy) ; United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) (collusive suit) ;
Agricultural Prorate Commission v. Mutual Orange Distributors, 318 U.S. 744 (1943)
(cause of mootness unreported) ; Stewart v. Southern Ry. Co., 315 U.S. 784 (1941) (settle-
ment); Retail Food Clerks & Mgrs. Union v. Union Premier Food Stores, Inc., 308 U.S.
526 (1940) (questions of law had been answered in prior hearing on supersedeas) ; Wood-
ring v. Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co., 302 U.S. 658 (1937) (cause of moot-
ness unreported) ; Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 302 U.S. 656 (1937) (cause of mootness
unreported; probably injunctive relief had become ineffectual) ; Bracken v. SEC, 299 U.S.
504 (1936) (acquiescence by one party); Hammond Clock Co. v. Schiff, 293 U.S. 529
(1934) (settlement); O'Ryan v. Mills Novelty Co., 292 U.S. 609 (1934) (passage of statute
made dispute moot); Danciger Oil & Rfg. Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S. 599 (1933) (parties
stipulate cause moot, reason unreported); First Union Trust & Savings Bank v. Consumers
Coal, 290 U.S. 585 (1933) (cause of mootness unreported); Coyne v. Prouty, 289 U.S.
704 (1932) (disputed statute repealed) ; Railroad Commission v. Macmillan, 287 U.S. 576
(1932) (disputed statute repealed); Mahan v. Hume, 287 U.S. 575 (1932) (lower decision
granting injunction reversed because Supreme Court had since held that injunction was
improper in that area) ; Hargis v. Bradford, 283 U.S. 781 (1931) (intervening law change,
exact nature unreported) ; Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930) (ac-
quiescence in judgment in prior suit) ; United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U.S. 812
(1929) (apparently the disputed ICC order was rescinded); Willing v. Chicago Auditorium
Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928) (premature controversy); United States ex rel. Norwegian
Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States Tariff Commission, 274 U.S. 106 (1927) (change
in law making requested relief ineffectual) ; Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. 528 (1926)
(disputed suspension had expired); Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216 (1923) (relief
requested had been granted) ; Atherton Mlls v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922) (party had
become too old to qualify as child laborer) ; Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359 (1921) (one
party sold his interest to a third party) ; United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113
(1920) (disputed statute repealed) ; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 360 (1919)
(alleged wrongful actions had been terminated) ; Public Utility Commissioners v. Compania
General de Tabacos, 249 U.S. 425 (1919) (disputed statute had been amended).
"Appeal, or writ of certiorari or error dismissed: Director of Prisons v. Court of First
Instances, 239 U.S. 633 (1915) (convicts had been executed prior to hearing on denial of
stay of execution); Stearns v. Wood, 236 U.S. 75 (1915) (plaintiff lacked legal interest
to bring suit); Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. AFL, 219 U.S. 581 (1911) (settlement);
United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297 (1909) (criminal acquittal cannot be appealed, no
legal question on appeal) ; Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174 (1906) (disputed suspension of
habeas corpus had been revoked) ; Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904) (acts sought
to be prohibited had been accomplished) ; Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378 (1900) (sentence
had already been served); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895) (payment of disputed tax
pending appeal); California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U.S. 308 (1893) (payment
of disputed tax pending appeal); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 141 U.S. 696 (1891) (payment
of disputed tax pending appeal); Washington Market Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 137 U.S.
62 (1890) (relief granted through another action) ; E. Tenn. R. Co. v. Southern Telegraph
Co., 125 U.S. 695 (1888) (one party acquired legal interest of other) ; Addington v. Burke,
125 U.S. 693 (1887) (settlement); San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 116 U.S.
138 (1885) (disputed payment had been made); Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222
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No particular disposition has ever been used exclusively. The Court has
said that it is free to make any disposition of a case which "justice may re-
quire."'18 However, it is certain that the Supreme Court prior to 1919, with
(1885) (settlement); Cheong Alh Moy v. United States, 113 U.S. 216 (1885) (plaintiff had
left territorial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court) ; Williams v. Hagood, 98 U.S. 72 (1878)
(abstract question) ; Wood-Paper Co. v. Heft, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 333 (1869) (defendant pur-
chased plaintiff's interest); United States v. Morillo, 1 Wall. (U.S.) 706 (1863) (lack of
legal interest by one party); Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 1 Black (U.S.) 419 (1861) (one
party equitably owns both interests); United States v. Chetimachas Indians, 131 U.S. lxx
Appx. (1852) (settlement); Cartwright v. Howe, 1 How. (U.S.) 188 (1843) (settlement).
"Appeal, or writ of certiorari or error dismissed: Schenley Distilling Corp. v. Anderson,
333 U.S. 878 (1948) (parties agree cause is moot, reason not shown) ; Pan American Airways
Corp. v. Grace & Co., 332 U.S. 827 (1947) (reason not reported, probably settlement) ;
Uyeki v. Styer, 329 U.S. 689 (1947) (reason for mootness unreported) ; Cantos v. Styer,
329 U.S. 686 (1946) (reason for mootness unreported) ; St. Pierre v. United States, 319
U.S. 41 (1943) (sentence had been served) ; Texas Consolidated Theaters v. Pittman, 305
U.S. 3 (1938) (settlement).
"Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman, 228 U.S. 610 (1913) (affirmed lower decree which
had dismissed case as moot; relief requested had been granted); Dinsmore v. Southern
Express Co., 183 U.S. 115 (1901) (lower decree affirmed because it dismissed the bill, which
the Supreme Court would have done because of mootness. Statute had been amended so
as to exclude plaintiffs).
"Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (1949) (review postponed indefinitely when Eislerjumped bail and fled the country); Royal Cadillac Service, Inc. v. United States, 317 U.S.
595 (1942) (judgment which denied temporary relief affirmed because permanent relief
had since been denied by ICC) ; Barker Co. v. Painters Union, 281 U.S. 462 (1930) (circuit
court of appeals' decree affirmed which had dismissed the bill because of mootness, disputed
act having been completed).
"' Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503 (1912) (reversed and "remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." Statutory cause of action abolished).
' Reversed (or vacated) and remanded for further proceedings in conformity with the
decision: Harris v. Battle, 348 U.S. 803 (1954) (protested action had ceased) ; Amalgamated
Ass'n S.E.R. & M.C.E. of A. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 416 (1951)
(companion case decision had forced reversal of this case) ; Riley v. International Brother-
hood of T., C., W. & H. of A., 336 U.S. 930 (1949) (reason for mootness unreported);
Dyer v. City Council of Beloit, 333 U.S. 825 (1948) (acquiescence) ; Natural Milk Producers
Ass'n v. San Francisco, 317 U.S. 423 (1943) (change in regulations made any relief impos-
sible) ; Washington ex rel. Columbia Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court of the State of
Washington for King County, 310 U.S. 613 (1940) (reason for mootness unreported).
" Appeal dismissed: Richardson v. McChesney, 218 U.S. 487 (1910) (acts sought to be
prevented have been done) ; Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt, 200 U.S. 446
(1906) (passage of time had made requested relief impossible) ; Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Prewitt, 200 U.S. 450 (1906) (passage of time had made requested relief impossible) ; Amer-
ican Book Co. v. Kansas, 193 U.S. 49 (1904) (disputed payment made pending appeal);
Tennessee v. Condon, 189 U.S. 64 (1903) (terms of disputed office had expired) ; Codlin
v. Kohlhausen, 181 U.S. 151 (1901) (act sought to be prohibited had been done) ; Tyler v.
Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900) (plaintiff lacked sufficient legal
interest) ; Kimball v. Kimball, 174 U.S. 158 (1899) (not "case" or "controversy" in federal
sense); Little v. Bowers, 134 U.S. 547 (1890) (disputed payment made pending appeal);
Peck v. Young, 1 How. (U.S.) 250 (1843) (settlement).
" Appeal dismissed: Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939) (act sought to be prohibited
was accomplished); Allen & Reed, Inc. v. Presbrey, 280 U.S. 518 (1929) (reason for moot-
ness unreported, apparently settlement).
Walling v. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1943). The government prosecuted Reuter,
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relatively few exceptions, dismissed the appeal when the case had become
moot, and that after 1919 the Court has just as definitely preferred, with little
explication, to reverse or vacate the lower judgment and remand with instruc-
tions. The aberrations from the general manner of disposition in each of the
two periods (pre-1919 and post-1919) in appeals from both state and federal
courts (the un-italicized numbers in the chart) do suggest, however, that con-
siderations of justice and not "rules" of disposition of moot cases are control-
ling where such considerations are germane.
Of the cases from the federal system, the nine pre-1919 appeals which were
reversed or vacated and remanded with instructions1 9 were mostly cases where
the dismissal of the appeal might well have worked an injustice.2 0 Collusive
actions were reversed and the complaint dismissed, 21 as were injunctions, when
the appeals had become moot.22 When circumstances beyond either party's
control made an antitrust case moot, judgments for the defendants were va-
cated,23 and where either disposition would prejudice one or the other party
to an action, the Court remanded with appropriate instructions.2 4 On the other
hand, examination of the cases did not show any reason why the six post-1919
Inc., a family corporation, for a wage and hour violation and obtained an injunction against
the officers and managers. Walling v. Reuter, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. La., 1943). Pending
appeal to the circuit court of appeals the corporation was dissolved. Reuter pleaded that
the proceeding was moot and that the proper procedure was to reverse and dismiss. The
circuit court of appeals reversed on this ground. Reuter, Inc. v. Walling, 137 F. 2d 315
(C.A. 5th, 1943). On appeal the Supreme Court reinstated the injunction as against the
individuals originally named and remanded the case to the district court for further pro-
ceedings as if no appeal had ever been taken from the trial decree. The Supreme Court was
undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the individuals had begun again the same operations
'previously carried on by Reuter, Inc.
Cases cited note 8 supra.
:°Meyer v. Pritchard, 131 U.S. ccix Appx. (1873), is the only case cited in note 8 which
does not present good reason to eliminate the lower judgment. The appellant was the original
plaintiff and judgment had been for the defendant. The mootness was caused solely (though
unwittingly) by the plaintiff-appellant.
I Gardner v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 131 U.S. ciii Appx. (1873) ; Lord v. Veazie,
8 How. (U.S.) 251 (1850).
Berry v. Davis, 242 U.S. 468 (1917) (lower court had erroneously taken jurisdiction
when action was moot, Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 [S.D. Iowa, 1914]); New Orleans
Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 161 U.S. 101 (1896).
'United States v. American-Asiatic S.S. Co., 242 U.S. 537 (1917); United States v.
Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U.S. 466 (1915). The suits
were terminated by the necessary cessation of alleged illegal activities.
2' South Spring Gold Co. v. Amador Gold Co., 145 U.S. 300 (1892). The control of the
disputing corporations had passed since trial into the hands of a third party. The two
corporations were still existent and organized; and the new managers of the corporations
wished the Court to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim for the benefit of the plaintiff's minority
stockholders. The appeal being moot, the Court could not adjudicate the claim, but reversal
would injure the plaintiff's minority stockholders since the plaintiff had recovered judgment
below. Dismissal of the appeal would likewise prejudice the managers. Thus the Court
vacated and remanded with instructions to allow a new trial.
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federal cases disposed of by dismissing the appeal25 were not reversed or
vacated according to the general rule recognized in 1919.
Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dennis,2 6 the only pre-1919 state case
in which the lower decision was reversed and remanded, was so disposed of
because the statute on which the judgment for the plaintiff had been rendered
had since been declared unconstitutional. Analysis of the two post-1919 state
cases in which the appeals were dismissed2 7 instead of the judgments vacated
and remanded reveals no reason for this variation in disposition (as with the
federal cases similarly treated).
That there may be exceptions to every rule as the demands of justice require
does not of course explain why the general manner of disposition of moot
appeals has changed. As previously stated, there seems to be no explicit single
reason for the change. The twenty-three pre-1919 federal cases in which the
appeal was dismissed 2s seem to have been satisfactorily handled, at least only
in one instance were adverse consequences discovered.29 The only explanation
which has been offered to rationalize the present practice of eliminating the
lower judgment is the desire to preclude possible unjust unforeseen effects,80
and collateral estoppel.3 ' It had been generally thought, however, that no
collateral estoppel would flow from a decree moot on appeal.
32
The generally accepted position refusing collateral estoppel effects in a judg-
ment moot on appeal was qualified at least insofar as the federal courts are
concerned by United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.33 In the Munsingwear case,
the government filed two actions against Munsingwear, a suit for an injunc-
tion and a treble damage action, both suits based upon alleged violations of
' Cases cited note 11 supra. ' Cases cited note 17 supra.
"224 U.S. 503 (1912). ' Cases cited note 10 supra.
SNew Orleans Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 160 U.S. 170 (1895), is the one exception.
Louisiana passed an act for the inspection of all flour entering the port of New Orleans.
Glover obtained an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the act. Pending the appeal to the
Supreme Court the disputed act was repealed, mooting the appeal. The Supreme Court dis-
missed the appeal. One year later the Supreme Court vacated its disposition and reversed
and dismissed the original injunction, because the language of the injunction which had
been left in force was so broad as to hamper the inspectors in their normal duties. New
Orleans Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 161 U.S. 101 (1896).
o See, e.g., New Orleans Flour case discussed in note 29 supra.
Consult United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950); Stern & Gressman,
Supreme Court Practice 342 (1950 ed.); Cases Moot On Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial
Power, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 772, 794 (1955).
'Restatement of judgments, § 69(2) (1942 ed.). See also Scott, Collateral Estoppel by
judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (1942). Recently, however, Mr. Justice Schaefer
speaking for the Illinois Supreme Court stated that "the effect, as res judicata of a judg-
ment which could not be reviewed because intervening circumstances made the case moot,
has not been settled in this State." People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 623, 104
N.E. 2d 769, 772-73 (1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
-340 U.S. 36 (1950).
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the same OPA ceiling price regulations. The actions were split by agreement,
that for injunctive relief being tried first and denied on the merits by the trial
court. 84 Pending appeal to the circuit court of appeals, the articles in question
were decontrolled, and the appeal was dismissed as m6ot.35 Munsingwear then
moved in the district court to dismiss the treble damage action on the ground
that the unreversed judgment of the district court in the injunction proceeding
collaterally estopped the prosecution of the damage actions. This motion was
granted and affirmed on appeal by the circuit court of appeals. 36 The Supreme
Court affirmed stating that if the government had not wished to be collaterally
estopped to relitigate the question of the alleged violations of the rgulations,
it should have requested reversal and dismissal of the injunction proceeding
when the circuit court of appeals held that the appeal was moot. Denial of the
petition to reverse would have been grounds for appeal to the Supreme Court.
3 7
Under the doctrine of the Munsingwear case the circuit courts have a
"duty" to reverse or vacate the district court judgment when moot on appeal,
at least if requested by the appellant.38 The circuit courts have apparently
resolved any ambiguity by reversing in all moot appeals.3 9 Nothing definite,
'Bowles v. Munsingwear, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 933 (D. Minn., 1945).
'Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F. 2d 125 (CA. 8th, 1947).
" United States v. Munsingwear, 178 F. 2d 204 (C.A. 8th, 1949).
'United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950). Although the Supreme
Court undoubtedly placed its decision in the Munsingwear case on procedural "acquiescence"
by the government, it is submitted that another consideration was also present, a desire
by the Supreme Court to force a complete review of actions held to be moot. Commentators
have overlooked the importance of the particular controversy. An administrative order was
the basis of the prosecutions, and its revocation caused the mootness. Yet the Supreme Court
might not have upheld the circuit court of appeals' decision that the injunction proceeding
was moot (although there is no language to indicate this). Where short term administrative
orders are contested, their revocation does not necessarily moot any proceeding brought
under them. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911). In the Munsing-
wear case the proper course for the United States would have been to contest the disposition
in the decision of mootness by the circuit court of appeals through appeal to the Supreme
Court. If the circuit court of appeals had originally vacated and dismissed the injunction
proceeding, Munsingwear could have appealed the merits of the finding of mootness in an
attempt to protect the judgment of the district court rendered in their favor. In either situ-
ation the Supreme Court would have had to pass on the validity of the finding of mootness.
The Munsingwear doctrine has given rise to both favorable and unfavorable comment-
unfavorable: 30 B. U. L. Rev. 426 (1950) ; 50 Col. L. Rev. 716 (1950) ; 26 N. D. Bar Briefs
423 (1950) ; favorable: 48 Mich. L. Rev. 1208 (1950) ; 35 Minn. L. Rev. 506 (1951) ; 7 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 230 (1950).
's United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950). The "duty" to reverse or
vacate is not clearly defined by the Supreme Court. It might be the duty of the circuit courts
to reverse and vacate only if requested, or in all moot appeals even if no request has been
made. A third possibility, unlikely in view of the language of the case, would require that a
strong showing of possible prejudice be made. Consult note 39 infra.
Io Three cases moot on appeal to the circuit courts have since been disposed of on the
authority of the Munsingwear case: Kelaghan v. Industrial Trust Co., 211 F. 2d 134 (C.A.
1st, 1954) (order of vacation and dismissal without prejudice despite defendant-appellee's
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however, has been said about the collateral estoppel effects of judgments
which become moot on appeal to the Supreme Court.
Theoretically, there exist at least five possibilities as to alternative modes of
disposition by the Supreme Court and attendant collateral estoppel effects:
1. Collateral estoppel will not attach to any judgment moot upon appeal to
the Supreme Court regardless of the disposition by that Court. Munsingwear
did not deal with this situation, of course, but it seems most probable that the
Supreme Court meant that collateral estoppel would attach to any judgment
on the merits which became moot on appeal and was not reversed and dis-
missed as moot. The assumption that an unreversed judgment moot on appeal
to the Supreme Court will give collateral estoppel effects introduces the
remaining possibilities; 2. The Supreme Court will always reverse a moot
appeal, without the necessity of motion from either party. This is unlikely
because parties could not then stipulate to allow the judgment on the merits
to stand; 3. The Supreme Court will and must reverse a judgment moot on
appeal if one party requests; 4. The Supreme Court will ordinarily reverse a
moot appeal if one party requests such disposition, but the Court will retain
discretion to refuse such requests. Munsingwear seems to deny such discretion,
at least to the circuit court, through reference to the "duty" to reverse when
requested; 5. The Supreme Court will reverse a moot appeal only if the peti-
tioning party can show possible prejudice, such as the pending proceeding in
Munsingwear. This seems very unlikely, in view of the consistent use of the
prevailing mode of disposition.
stipulation that it would not use the prior judgment as res judicata in any future action
which the plaintiff wished to bring); Hann v. Hawk, 205 F. 2d 839, 840 (C.A. 8th, 1953)
("Following the established practice in dealing with a case such as this which became moot
pending a decision of this Court on the merits, the judgment appealed from is vacated and
the case is remanded with directions to dismiss it." The Hann case was an appeal from a
decision granting habeas corpus) ; Acheson v. Droesse, 197 F. 2d 574 (C.A. D.C., 1952) pre-
sents an interesting resolution of the ambiguous "duty." Droesse brought an action to cancel
a Certificate of Loss of Nationality issued by the Secretary of State. Trial judgment went
for Droesse on the pleadings. Pending appeal to the circuit court of appeals, Congress en-
acted a private law allowing Droesse to retain her citizenship, mooting the appeal. Droesse
moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that there could be no future litigation. The
government requested vacation and dismissal on the authority of the Munsingwear case.
The circuit court of appeals dismissed the appeal and then remanded the case to the district
court with directions to vacate its judgment. "We think the language of the Supreme Court
in the Munsingwear case clearly directs the Courts of Appeals that in all civil cases in the
United States courts which became moot pending appeal, and in which a motion to dismiss
as moot is accompanied by a motion to direct that the judgment below be vacated, both
motions should be granted." Acheson v. Droesse, 197 F. 2d 574, 578 (CA. D.C., 1952). The
plaintiff in the Droesse case had been awarded the only decision on the merits, and the rea-
son why the appeal became moot was compatible with the judgment; therefore the circuit
court of appeals should have simply dismissed the appeal and allowed the lower judgment
to stand in case the private law should be repealed. For further explanation of this position
consult discussion of Alton v. Alton hypothetical case at page 89. Consult Dyer v. City
Council of Beloit, 252 Wis. 249, 32 N.W. 2d 333 (1948), to see how a state court might have
handled a similar problem.
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Possibility three is the one most likely, as indicated by the lack of dismissal
of any moot appeals since the Munsingwear case.40 (This record of unvarying
reversals also preserves, of course, possibility two.) This position, however,
could lead to serious injustice in some instances. (See discussion page 89
infra.) Possibilities four and five are less likely, but probably the more just.
If the appellant cannot show a pending or probable proceeding which would
be unjustly affected by the unreversed judgment moot on appeal, there is no
reason why the judgment should not be allowed to stand so as to allow merger
and bar effects. (See discussion page 93 infra.)
Examination of all the cases indicates a possible hidden reason for the gen-
eral change in disposition. Insofar as the cases from the federal system are
concerned, it is of interest that sixteen of the thirty-seven post-1919 cases
which were reversed or vacated 4 1 were suits to contest the validity of an
executive or administrative ruling. No post-1919 federal cases in which the
appeal was dismissed 42 concern the same type of action. The modern "general
rule" as to the disposition of actions in the federal system and moot upon
appeal to the Supreme Court is then about forty per-cent comprised of cases
involving administrative and executive ruling contests where the disposition
has been unvarying. It is conceivable that the Supreme Court has good
reason for giving a disposition which eliminates the lower judgment in most
appeals testing administrative rulings. Perhaps the rapidly changing nature of
administrative law requires that all judgments moot on appeal be eliminated
for stare decisis reasons. Since so many of the appeals concern just such ques-
tions, the Court may without conscious design have fallen into the use of such
disposition in all of its moot appeals, whether the cases come from the state or
federal system.
Although the administrative rulings cases may offer some explanation in
addition to considerations of collateral estoppel and other "unforeseen effects"
as to why the Supreme Court has changed its general manner of disposition in
cases coming from the federal courts, there is no additional reason, other than
"o Consult notes 11, 13 and 17 supra. It is impossible to determine whether there were
requests for reversals in all cases since Munsingwear.
"'SEC v. Harrison, 340 U.S. 908 (1951); SEC v. Philadelphia Co., 337 U.S. 901 (1949);
SEC v. Engineers Public Service Co., 332 U.S. 788 (1947); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
United States, 326 U.S. 690 (1945) ; SEC v. Long Island Lighting Co., 325 U.S. 833 (1945) ;
Agricultural Prorate Commission v. Mutual Orange Distributors, 318 U.S. 744 (1943);
Woodring v. Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co., 302 U.S. 658 (1937); Bracken
v. SEC, 299 U.S. 504 (1936) ; Danciger Oil & Rfg. Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S. 599 (1933) ; R.R.
Commission v. Macmillan, 287 U.S. 576 (1932); Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281
U.S. 249 (1930); United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U.S. 812 (1929); United States
ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States Tariff Commission, 274 U.S. 106
(1927) ; Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216 (1923) ; United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253
U.S. 113 (1920); Public Utility Commissioners v. Compania General de Tabacos, 249 U.S.
425 (1919).
4 Cases cited note 11 supra.
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habit formed in disposing of federal moot appeals, which would seem to ex-
plain the general change from simply dismissing the appeals in cases from the
state courts.
Of the six post-1919 state cases disposed of by vacation,43 only two present
definite reasons for the use of this mode of disposition. Amalgamated Ass'n
S.E.R.&M.C.E. of A. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board44 was an
appeal from a temporary award made on the basis of the Wisconsin Public
Utilities Anti-Strike Statute. 45 The case was one of two companion cases, in
the other case an injunction having been granted on the basis of the same
statute. On appeal, the injunction was reversed46 because the Supreme Court
found that the Anti-Strike Statute was in conflict with the federal emergency
labor relations provision of the Labor Management Relations Act as amended
in 1947. 4 7 It was necessary presumably to reverse the temporary award to
prevent any collateral estoppel effects.48 In Dyer v. City Council of Beloit,49
the appellant had been denied a license to sell milk in the city of Beloit by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.5° Pending appeal, Dyer was granted his license,
mooting his appeal. Dyer requested that the Wisconsin judgment be reversed
so that after he had withdrawn his appeal the license could not be withdrawn
on the basis of the unreversed Wisconsin judgment which denied Dyer's right
to a license. The Supreme Court vacated the lower judgment and remanded
the cause to the Wisconsin court for further proceedings.51 The Wisconsin
court then reversed its own previous judgment and remanded the case for dis-
missal.52 Apparently when a judgment from a state court becomes moot on
appeal to the Supreme Court and is vacated and remanded, it is proper to
have a rehearing before the state supreme court. The state supreme court then
decides whether to reverse or affirm its prior judgment.53
' Cases cited note 15 supra. "340 U.S. 416 (1951).
',Wis. Stat. §§ 111.50-111.64 (1953 ed.).
"Amalgamated Ass'n S.E.R. & M.C.E. of A. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
340 U.S. 383 (1951).
"7 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, §§ 206-10, 61 Stat. 155-56 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 176-80 (1952 ed.).
'Regarding the applicability of the Munsingwear doctrine to state cases see p. 95.
"333 U.S. 825 (1948).
'Dyer v. City Council of Beloit, 250 Wis. 613, 27 N.W. 2d 733 (1947).
' Dyer v. City Council of Beloit, 333 U.S. 825 (1948).
'Dyer v. City Council of Beloit, 252 Wis. 249, 32 N.W. 2d 333 (1948).
"Dyer v. City Council of Beloit, 250 Wis. 613, 27 N.W. 2d 733 (1947) (aff'd), 333 U.S.
825 (1948) (vacated and remanded), 252 Wis. 249, 32 N.W. 2d 333 (1948) (judgment ap-
pealed from reversed and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint) ; Natu-
ral Milk Producers Ass'n v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d 101, 124 P. 2d 25 (1942) (aff'd),
317 U.S. 423 (1943) (vacated and remanded), 24 Cal. 2d 122, 148 P. 2d 377 (1944) (be-
cause the plaintiffs advanced the same arguments as previously, the court affirmed the views
expressed in its previous opinion); Washington ex rel. Columbia Broadcasting Co. v. Su-
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No apparent dissatisfaction had existed with the previous usual practice of
dismissing appeals in cases from the state courts, Kimball v. Kimball54 being
the only pre-1919 state case disposed of by dismissing the appeal5 5 which
presented any problems in the choice of appropriate disposition. Mr. Kimball
died, apparently intestate. This action was a suit brought by Kimball's alleged
widow contesting the issuance of letters of administration to Kimball's mother
and sister. The defense was that the alleged widow had never been legally
divorced from a prior husband. (The alleged widow had left her New York
City home and gone to North Dakota, where after a three months' residence
she had obtained a default decree of divorce from her first husband. The
widow immediately returned to New York City and six months later went
through a marriage ceremony with Kimball.)
The New York Court of Appeals held that the alleged widow was not en-
titled to the letters of administration because she had not been legally di-
vorced. 50 Writ of error was taken to the Supreme Court, but before hearing
there it was learned that some time previous to the New York Court of Appeals
hearing a will had been found and admitted to probate, thus mooting the ad-
ministration contest. Fearing that the New York Court of Appeals decision
would collaterally estop her in a will contest, the alleged widow requested that
the moot appeal be reversed and the action dismissed. The Supreme Court
noted this but refused the request and simply dismissed the writ of error. 57
This action seems to be an exception to the usual practice of allowing a re-
quested specific disposition in a moot appeal.58 Also, in spite of the question-
able finality of the New York decree, that decision has been given stare decisis
effect by the Supreme Court in subsquent cases.59
No instance has been discovered in which a disposition later occasioned
serious injustice.60 The dissent of Mr. justice Black in Alton v. Alton,61 how-
perior Court for King County, 1 Wash. 2d 379, 96 P. 2d 248 (1939) (writ of appeal denied),
310 U.S. 613 (1940) (vacated and remanded), 5 Wash. 2d 711, 105 P. 2d 70 (1940) (motion
to vacate judgment granted, but motion to withdraw opinion denied, even if it could have
been done as a practical matter. Motion to grant costs denied).
174 U.S. 158 (1899). ' Cases cited note 16 supra.
In re Kimball, 155 N.Y. 62 (1898).
Kimball v. Kimball, 174 U.S. 158 (1899). Apparently no further actions were attempted
by the alleged widow.
'United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (vacation will be granted on
request); Pan American Airways Corp. v. Grace & Co., 332 U.S. 827 (1947) (dismissal of
appeal granted on mutual request). Consult Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 342
(1950 ed.). Consult note 38 supra for discussion of the ambiguous position of the Supreme
Court concerning the "duty" of the circuit courts of appeals to reverse or vacate moot
appeals.
' The United States Supreme Court cites In re Kimball, 155 N.Y. 62 (1898), as authority
within New York in Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 15, 170 (1901); Omsted v. Omsted,
216 U.S. 386, 391 (1910).
' But see note 29 supra. 347 U.S. 610, 611 (1954).
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ever, raises this specter. Mr. and Mrs. Alton were residents of Connecticut.
Mrs. Alton moved to the Virgin Islands and after a six week and one day
residence filed an action for divorce. Mr. Alton entered a general appearance
but did not contest. The judge refused to hear the cause on the ground that
the petitioner had not established domicile in spite of compliance with the
statutory domiciliary requirements. The court of appeals affirmed the want of
jurisdiction en banc by a divided court.62 Certiorari was granted63 and the
case was argued on April 7, 1954.64 Mr. Alton subsequently obtained a divorce
in Connecticut, and on May 17, 1954, the Court issued an order requiring the
parties to show cause why the judgment should not be vacated and the cause
dismissed as moot.6 5 On June 1, 1954, the Court ordered that "[tihe judgment
of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause is remanded to the District
Court with directions to vacate its judgment and to dismiss the proceeding
upon the ground that the cause is moot." 66 Justice Black in his dissent declared
that the Supreme Court should determine whether the petitioner was entitled
to have her Virgin Islands divorce, since under Williams v. North Carolina
11,67 the Connecticut divorce may not protect the petitioner from conviction
for bigamy in the Virgin Islands or elsewhere.
While it appears that Justice Black's fears were groundless, a few altera-
tions in the facts will illustrate the problem he apparently had in mind.
Assume that in the divorce proceeding in the Virgin Islands, H had entered a
special appearance contesting the court's jurisdiction. W nevertheless is
granted her divorce, and H appeals the finding of jurisdiction to the court of
appeals, which affirms, and then to the Supreme Court. H then attempts to
establish residence in Nevada, desiring a divorce in which his wife appears to
be the guilty party. Before the Supreme Court has acted, Nevada enters a
decree of absolute divorce. The Supreme Court then follows the same pro-
cedure it used in the Alton case, and orders the proceedings below to be va-
cated. W remarries, and returns to Connecticut. That state then institutes a
bigamy prosecution against her and under the doctrine of Williams v. North
Carolina 168 overcomes the presumption of validity of the Nevada divorce
by proving that H had not been domiciled there. Because of the Supreme
'Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 667 (C.A. 3d, 1953). 8 22 U.S.L. Week 3255.
'Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 911 (1954). 'Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 965 (1954).
" Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 610, 611 (1954). A serious constitutional question, the validity
of the Virgin Islands divorce law making residence prima facie domicile, was raised by the
Alton case. Another case involving the identical question reached the Supreme Court almost
immediately. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955), held that the Virgin
Islands' legislature had exceeded the powers granted by its Organic Act.
-325 U.S. 226 (1945). Williams was convicted of bigamy after a remarriage in North
Carolina preceded by a Nevada divorce which North Carolina found to be invalid for lack
of jurisdiction.
w 325 U.S. 226 (1945). Every state may examine another state's divorce judgments to see
if jurisdiction was obtained over the parties.
19551 COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Court's disposition of the Virgin Islands decree, W has been deprived of the
defense of that decree, which Connecticut may have found to be valid. It is
apparent that in this hypothetical situation the injustice to W may be consid-
erable if the Supreme Court vacates the Virgin Islands decree. No reason can
be suggested why W should not have whatever res judicata benefits she can
derive from the Virgin Islands decree, and accordingly the Supreme Court
should dismiss the appeal rather than vacate all proceedings below. If the
judgment below is consistent with the reason the case has become moot, dis-
missal of the appeal is desirable in order to protect the parties in case the
appeal really is not moot.60 A similar situation may arise in guardianship or
other proceedings involving domestic relations.
Justice Black pointed out that the proceedings in the Alton case might not
be moot since if the Connecticut divorce were invalid, the parties were still
married. But the Altons being residents of Connecticut, that state's decree was
almost certainly valid. And in any case, the Virgin Islands divorce had not
been granted. It is perhaps questionable whether the hypothetical case would
be considered moot by the Supreme Court.70
H
It has been illustrated that a major problem in the appellate disposition of
moot cases is the degree to which the lower court decision on the merits should
be accorded res judicata effect. The order entered by the Supreme Court con-
trols this to the extent that vacation eliminates the lower judgment and any
res judicata effect. If the Supreme Court simply dismisses the appeal, pre-
sumably the decision below on the merits remains outstanding and collateral
estoppel effect attaches. 1
It may be categorically stated that no single rule should mechanically be
applied in every case. There is a fundamental conflict between the policy of
concluding litigation underlying the doctrines of res judicata and the desire
not to preclude parties who have not had a full appellate review. Generaliza-
tions are necessarily difficult; the following analysis considers only the simpler
illustrations of this underlying conflict.
The doctrines of res judicata may be subdivided into collateral estoppel,
merger, and bar. Parties are precluded from relitigating facts in a second
But see discussion of Acheson v. Droesse, 197 F. 2d 574 (C.A. D.C., 1952) note 38 supra.
If both parties agree that the appeal is moot, the Supreme Court would presumably be
bound since adversaries would be lacking. If W were to argue that the Nevada decree was
not necessarily valid, the Court might not dispose of the appeal as moot, but the Court
would have to make a finding of the invalidity of the Nevada decree before it could dispose
of the appeal on the merits. It is suggested that in the hypothetical situation the Supreme
Court would have to dispose of the appeal as moot without making a finding on the ques-
tion of the validity of the Nevada divorce.
I Consult Munsingwear discussion page 83 supra.
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cause of action that were actually decided in a previous suit. If the plaintiff
receives a money judgment the cause of action is merged into his judgment and
may not be sued on subsequently. If the defendant receives a judgment on the
merits the parties are barred from relitigating the cause of action. The first is
collateral estoppel, the second merger, and the third bar. 72
Respecting collateral estoppel, the Restatement of Judgments says: "Where
a party to a judgment cannot obtain the decision of an appellate court because
the matter determined against him is immaterial or moot, the judgment is not
conclusive against him in a subsequent action on a different cause of action."73
Allegheny County v. Maryland Casualty Co.74 illustrates the application of
this principle. Poole Engineering Company had sold a large quantity of
voting machines to the county. A taxpayer, Bassett, brought a prior suit in
equity to restrain the county from paying the balance of the purchase price
on the ground that the machines were defective. Poole was joined as a neces-
sary party. After Bassett's evidence had been heard, Poole's motion to dismiss
was granted, Bassett appealing from the decree ordering dismissal. Meanwhile
Poole was granted a mandamus ordering the county to pay the remainder of
the price and the county complied before Bassett's appeal was heard. The
Court of Common Pleas for Allegheny County decided that Bassett's appeal
was moot, and it was dismissed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. 5
In the principal action the county sought payment from Maryland Casualty
Company as surety for Poole, alleging that the machines were defective.
Maryland (as privity with Poole) sought to use the decision of the chancellor
in the Bassett case to estop the county from relitigating the question of the
fitness of the machines. The Third Circuit held that because the Bassett case
had become moot before the appeal was heard, no res judicata effect could
attach to the chancellor's opinion.7 6
The authors of the Restatement have felt that for purposes of collateral
estoppel the desirability of appellate review outweighs the policy of preventing
relitigation of factual issues.7 7 The Munsingwear case suggests that in the
federal courts the question turns on the disposition given the moot appeal,
72 Definitions may be found in the Restatement of Judgments. Consult §§ 45(a), 46(a),
47 (merger) ; 45(b), 46(b), 48 (bar) ; 45(c), 46(c), 68 (collateral estoppel).
"Restatement of Judgments, § 69(2). In the federal courts, apparently, a party wishing
to avoid collateral estoppel effects must request and obtain reversal or vacation and dis-
missal. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). Consult discussion page 83
infra.
- 146 F. 2d 633 (C.A. 3d, 1944), cert. denied 325 U.S. 855 (1945), annotated at 157 A.L.R.
1032 (1945).
"' Bassett v. Armstrong, 309 Pa. 296, 163 Atl. 525 (1932).
' It may be questioned, however, whether the county should not be collaterally estopped
from relitigating the fitness of the machines because of its failure to use this defense in the
mandamus proceeding.
I Consult also Scott, Collateral Estoppel by judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1942).
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although the Supreme Court will allow most all moot appeals to be reversed.78
The policy behind the Restatement's position on collateral estoppel need not
necessarily control for purposes of merger and bar. The Restatement of Judg-
ments does not adopt a position on whether merger or bar should attach in a
case moot on appeal. Whereas in collateral estoppel two causes of action are
involved, in merger and bar, by definition, only one cause of action is present
and the question is whether the entire case should be tried anew. Two exam-
ples should suffice to illustrate that the latter situations require a different
general principle.
1. Assume that P owns two dwellings located near D's factory. Vibration
from the factory damages both dwellings. P sues for the damage to one dwell-
ing and receives judgment. The parties compromise while an appeal is pend-
ing before the Supreme Court. In this situation the appeal is moot, but the
Court should dismiss the appeal rather than vacate the proceedings. There is
always the possibility that P will attempt to bring suit for the damage to the
other dwelling. If the case had not become moot, P's second claim would have
become merged into his judgment on simple principles of splitting a cause of
action. 79 P should not be permitted to escape the force of this rule simply
because mootness intervenes.
2. P sues D for breach of contract. D has a counterclaim on the contract,
but does not present it; judgment is entered for D on P's claim. P appeals, but
while the appeal is pending the parties settle. Again the Supreme Court should
dismiss the appeal rather than vacate. D would have been barred from bring-
ing his counterclaim as an original action if the case had not become moot,8 0
and the fortuitous occurrence of mootness should not permit D to correct his
error.
A major consideration in the disposition of moot appeals should be, of
course, that injustice be avoided in the immediate situation, and in certain
cases this means that vacation rather than dismissal is the preferable decree.
A prospective order to comply with a statute is a simple illustration. If the
statute is repealed while an appeal is pending, quite clearly the Supreme
Court should vacate so that the defendant cannot be required to perform in
accordance with the repealed statute.8 ' Another illustration is where the moot-
ness can be remedied by a proper amendment of the pleadings. In such cases,
the Court should remand to the trial court for further proceedings.8 2 In some
situations, the continuation of an order or judgment may hamper a person or
But see note 18 supra.
Szostak v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 279 Mich. 603, 273 N.W. 284 (1937).
'Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(a).
I United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U.S. 812 (1929) ; New Orleans Flour Inspectors
v. Glover, 160 U.S. 170 (1895), vacated 161 U.S. 101 (1896) (semble).
I South Spring Gold Co. v. Amador Gold Co., 145 U.S. 300 (1892) (semble), discussed
note 24 supra.
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tend to bring him into disrepute. If there is a mandamus order to a public
official, and the order is complied with before the appeal is heard, it probably
is desirable to vacate for this reason.8 3 Other situations may involve paternity
or bastardy proceedings, where marriage has subsequently occurred. In such
cases, the interest of the child as well as the parties in litigation must be
considered.
In summarizing res judicata considerations, the Supreme Court has ap-
parently adopted reversal of the lower judgment as the disposition for moot
appeals in an effort to prevent unforeseen and undesirable effects. These
effects have been of two types, collateral estoppel and the consequences of con-
tinuation of a judgment which by its very nature should be eliminated when
the appeal is moot. The Supreme Court has apparently not considered the
possibility of the application of merger and bar in judgments moot on appeal.
There is no reason why a judgment moot on appeal should not have as much
effect as is possible and just. It would seem that in order that a possible
second suit be avoided if one of the parties has failed to bring a claim at the
proper time, the proper procedure for the Supreme Court in disposing of the
moot appeal should be to dismiss the appeal rather than to reverse or vacate.
A party who feels himself unjustly prejudiced by allowing the decision on the
merits to stand would then have the burden to show cause why it should be re-
versed or vacated. In addition, discretion should be allowed the courts in
exceptional situations to refuse to apply bar and merger where the result would
be injustice.
III
Theoretically, stare decisis considerations should not enter into the Supreme
Court's determination of whether a moot appeal should be dismissed or
whether an order to vacate should be entered. If the opinion below is officially
reported, it will always remain in the volume; even if the decision is vacated,
the force of the reasoning remains.84 There has never been any doubt that
cases which reach a state supreme court on the merits are full authority within
that state, even though they become moot on appeal to the Supreme Court.85
Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216 (1923) (semble).
Consult Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 214 F. 2d 820 (C.A. 3d, 1954). The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit which had also decided the Alton case followed the reason-
ing therein even though the Alton decision had been reversed and dismissed as moot by the
Supreme Court. (See supra pp. 88-89.) "That decision must govern this. While individual
members of the Court have not modified their views as set out in the opinions in that case, all
recognize the authority of a decision rendered after due consideration by the Court en banc."
Ibid.
I Natural Milk Producers Ass'n v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d 101, 124 P. 2d 2S (1942),
vacated and remanded 317 U.S. 423 (1943), prior judgment affirmed 24 Cal. 2d 122, 148 P.
2d 377 (1944) ; Kansas v. American Book Co., 65 Kan. 847, 69 Pac. 563 (1902), writ of error
dismissed 193 U.S. 49 (1904), decision followed in Kansas v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
75 Kan. 609, 90 Pac. 299 (1907), and Cudahy Packing Co. v. Denton, 79 Kan. 369, 97 Pac.
439 (1909); Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn. 82, 65 S.W. 871 (1901), appeal dismissed 189
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The Supreme Court itself implied that it might give some stare decisis effect
to a decision moot upon appeal in Posados v. Warner Barnes & Co."0
Practically, however, the form of the Supreme Court decree may in certain
circumstances affect the stare decisis value of the decision on the merits as
indicated by the recent case of Harris v. Battle.s7 A state statute empowered
the governor to seize certain public service industries if a strike deemed harm-
ful to the public welfare were threatened.88 A union challenged the constitu-
tionality of this provision when the governor threatened to seize a transporta-
tion company in Richmond. The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond denied
the union's petition for an injunction to restrain the governor perpetually
from exercising his power, holding that the statute was in conflict with neither
the federal constitution nor the National Labor Relations Act.89 The governor
seized the transportation system, the dispute was settled, and the governor
relinquished control of the system before the union's appeal was decided by
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. That court held the appeal moot; it
entered an order dismissing the appeal, "the effect of which is to affirm the
decree of the said circuit court." 90 On appeal by the union the United States
Supreme Court concurred in the finding of mootness and vacated the order of
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, remanding for such proceedings as
that court deemed appropriate.0 '
U.S. 64 (1903), decision followed in Darnell v. Shepard, 156 Tenn. 544, 324 S.W. 661 (1928);
Little v. Bowers, 46 N.J.L. (S. Ct.) 300 (1884), writ of error dismissed 134 U.S. 547 (1890),
decision followed in McCran v. Ocean Grove, 96 NJ.L. (S. Ct.) 158, 114 AtI. 15 (1921).
- 279 U.S. 340, 345 (1929). "The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply with full force
prior to decision in the court of last resort." (Reference was to a case moot on appeal.)
- 348 U.S. 803 (1954). The Harris case concerns the only appeal to the Supreme Court
in a controversy moot before reaching the highest state court. This fact in itself justifies
considering the case independently of the other post-1919 state cases moot on appeal (notes
15 and 17 supra).
I Chapter 696 Laws of 1952, Virginia. m 26 Labor Cases 68,733.
' The full order of the court is reported in 26 Labor Cases 68,733 and not in the official
Virginia reporter which merely states, "appeal refused." Harris v. Battle, 195 Va. Ixxxviii
(1954).
'Mr. Justice Reed thought that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
on the authority of Norfolk & Southern Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U.S. 264, 269 (1912).
(After a state court refuses to hear an appeal for want of jurisdiction the Supreme Court
will not take jurisdiction.) Since the Supreme Court found in the Harris case that there
was jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, Mr. Justice Reed voted to dismiss (whether the
appeal or the full proceeding is not disclosed) on the ground of mootness. The majority of
the Court in the Harris case held that the case was moot and vacated and remanded the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' judgment on the authority of United States v. Anchor
Coal Co., 279 U.S. 812 (1929) (injunction vacated when moot on appeal). The injunction
in the Anchor case had been issued by a lower federal court. In the Harris case the Circuit
Court of the City of Richmond, a state court, denied the requested injunction; thus there
was no outmoded injunction to hamper anyone. It is believed that the Anchor Coal case
is not authority for the action taken by the Supreme Court in the Harris case.
Mr. Chief justice Warren, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. justice Douglas were of'the opinion
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The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals received the remanded cause on
December 9, 1954 and on January 19, 1955 entered the following order: "[I]t
appearing that the cause has become moot, and that there no longer exists a
justiciable issue to be determined by the Court, it is adjudged and ordered by
this Court that the said petition for appeal be and the same is hereby rejected
and the appeal refused.' 92 (Italics added.) The matter is now considered closed
by the Virginia court.
93
The Harris case was moot before reaching the highest Virginia court, thus
presumably there was no "case" or "controversy" 94 when certiorari was
granted. However, if the Munsingwear doctrine applies to cases involving fed-
eral questions moot before the highest state court, it was necessary for the
union to appeal to the Supreme Court in order to preclude collateral estoppel
attaching to the decision of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. But
the Supreme Court neither mentioned the Munsingwear case nor offered any
rationale for taking jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's use of the usual form
of decree in cases moot after appeal from a state court was an interference
with Virginia's disposition of its own moot appeals, and certainly can be con-
strued as a rebuff to the Virginia court.9 5
The commentator in Labor Cases in commenting on the Harris case states:
Inasmuch as the case had become moot, the state supreme court, on appeal from
a trial court decision which sustained the validity of the state law and denied an in-
junction, should not have handed down a decision the effect of which was to affirm
the trial court's decree. For that reason, the U.S. Supreme Court vacates the state
supreme court's judgment and remands the case to that court for appropriate ac-
tion.9 6 [Italics added.]
that the case was not moot, but gave no grounds for their opinion. It is suggested that
possibly the dissenters were confusing the "continuing controversy" concept (Consult
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 [1911]), in which situation the Supreme
Court does not dismiss the action as moot, with the "public expedience" type of dispute
which, in spite of the public interest involved, the Supreme Court has consistently refused
to decide where the controversy is moot. Consult Amalgamated Ass'n of S.E.R. & M.C.E.
of A. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 416, 418 (1951); People ex rel.
Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E. 2d 769 (1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
" Copy of the Virginia Court of Appeals decree submitted by the Clerk of Court, October
27, 1955.
'Letter of the Clerk of Court, October 27, 1955.
" U.S. Const. Art. 3, § 2. Consult note 4 supra.
'The customary disposition in cases moot on appeal because of the lapse of time (e.g.,
the Harris case) in the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, is appeal dismissed. Hankins v.
Virginia Beach, 182 Va. 642, 644, 29 S.E. 2d 831, 832 (1944); Hamer v. Commonwealth,
107 Va. 636, 637, 59 S.E. 400 (1907) ; Franklin v. Peers, 95 Va. 602, 603, 29 S.E. 321 (1898).
"26 Labor Cases 68,733. The decision by the Richmond court appears to be in direct
conflict with the Supreme Court's opinion in Amalgamated Ass'n S.E.R. & M.C.E. of A. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relation Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951), which decided that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,
§ 206-10, providing for emergency situations, specifically public utilities labor disputes,
had pre-empted the field from the states.
19551 COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
It might be inferred that the Supreme Court wished to inform the Virginia
courts that the lower decision was incorrect and should not be followed, thus
indirectly indicating that the Richmond court decision should have no stare
decisis effect in other cases arising in the Virginia courts. But then the major-
ity of the Supreme Court apparently decided on the merits a case they held to
be moot.
IV
Conclusions and generalizations are necessarily difficult to make. Certainly,
a universally applicable rule of disposition, as it appears the Supreme Court
has developed, may lead to injustice in some instances. The decision of the
Supreme Court in Harris v. Battle may represent a rigid application of the
usual rule of vacation. If this is all the case represents, it nevertheless will
probably be interpreted as a decision on the merits in a moot case.
The position adopted by the Supreme Court in the Munsingwear case
apparently is that collateral estoppel will attach in an unreversed judgment
moot on appeal. It might be argued that where the mootness issue is carried to
the highest court, collateral estoppel should not attach irrespective of
the mode of disposition. Because of this fear of collateral estoppel, however,
judgments have since been always vacated or reversed. This may mean that
merger and bar effects are not now possible in judgments moot on appeal. The
rule of the Munsingwear case has led the Supreme Court further than it real-
ized at the time. Considerations of fairness to the immediate parties should
govern disposition of a moot appeal. In the absence of factors recommending
reversal or vacation of the lower decree, it is suggested that all moot appeals
to the Supreme Court ought to be dismissed so as to gain whatever res judicata
benefits there may be. Stare decisis is not a proper subject for consideration
in the selection of a method of disposition.
CONSIDERATION FOR THE EMPLOYER'S PROMISE OF
A VOLUNTARY PENSION PLAN
There are two basic types of pension plan: those voluntarily adopted by the
employer, and those which are the product of collective bargaining. The
courts have had some analytical difficulty with voluntary plans.' The central
The phrase "voluntary pension plan" can be confusing. Its usual meaning is "voluntarily
adopted by the employer"; however it is also used where the employee has the option of
contributing or not contributing to the plan. Throughout this comnent, unless otherwise
indicated, "voluntary pension plan" means a plan voluntarily adopted by the employer and
not a plan which is the result of collective bargaining.
It should be added that while current interest is centered on collective bargaining and
executive pension plans, this comment is concerned solely with the problem of consideration
for the employer's promise of a pension plan. Discussion of collective bargaining and ex-
ecutive pension plans is accordingly limited to occasional comments bearing on the consid-
eration problem generally.
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